Good Governance Requires an Independent Judiciary
Shahram Kholdi, a legal scholar and researcher of Middle Eastern history and international relations, stressed that the foremost demand of any people after the collapse of an authoritarian regime is good governance—something, he argued, that is impossible without an independent judiciary.
Speaking at the Oslo conference “Governing in Transition and Safeguarding Citizens’ Rights in Iran” conference at the University of Oslo on 31 August 2024, Kholdi noted that like any society facing sudden state collapse, Iranians “will need, on the very night after the fall, above all an institution capable of resolving their disputes, whether simple or complex.” Drawing on both classical and modern political sociology, he noted that autocratic regimes often linger in painful decline before collapsing abruptly. What matters most, he said, is preparing for the day after. Possible scenarios range from civil war and elite coups to a negotiated, peaceful transition, such as in South Africa.
The determining factor, Kholdi argued, is how swiftly popular expectations are addressed in the weeks immediately following the collapse. Based on two decades of research, he underlined the universal aspiration for good governance, adding that such governance can only be secured under an independent judiciary.
Challenging a common consensus within the Iranian opposition, he contended that the immediate priority after regime change is not the convening of a constituent assembly but the establishment of a responsible interim government alongside a provisional national assembly. Such a body, he said, could both restrain the interim government and oversee elections for a constituent assembly, while taking urgent measures such as adopting a provisional bill of rights, suspending the death penalty, and guaranteeing judicial independence.
He warned that the opposition’s reluctance to embrace a provisional assembly is “a serious alarm bell for experts and activists,” cautioning against a repeat of 1979—when the interim government proved powerless against a charismatic leader and mobilised street forces.
Turning to the dangers of populism, Kholdi argued that in any form—whether far-left, ethnic or far-right—it poses the gravest threat to a democratic transition, particularly when national symbols such as the tricolour flag with the lion and sun are co-opted by factional agendas.
The historian devoted the closing part of his remarks to the need to revive Iran’s own tradition of judicial independence. “We do not need to reinvent the wheel,” he said, suggesting that Iran could return during the transition to laws from before 1979 that align with human-rights principles. He cited the 1956 principle of judicial uniformity and the right to interpreters for defendants unable to speak Persian as examples of legal heritage worth restoring.
He also highlighted child-protection laws from the 1950s and 1960s that barred the execution of minors—standards that were, in some respects, ahead of those in certain advanced democracies. Reviving this legal tradition, he argued, along with training young judges and lawyers by the older generation of a secular judiciary, could lay the foundations of a stable legal order in post-transition Iran within one to three years.
Even without the intervention of monarchists or prominent political leaders, Kholdi maintained, a provisional national assembly could appoint its own speaker as the acting head of state during the transition. Above all, he concluded, the independence of the judiciary must stand at the forefront of Iran’s future priorities: “Drawing on the legacy of the Constitutional Revolution and the pre-1979 legal tradition, Iran can lay the groundwork for a durable democracy.”