The Future of Governance in Iran: Beyond Western Liberal Democracy

Iran Human Rights: Events of the last few years have made the future of the Islamic Republic more uncertain than ever. The economic crisis has pulled a large sector of society into poverty and exposed systematic corruption and the authorities’ incompetence in solving people’s daily problems. Faced with discontent, the Islamic Republic’s only recourse has been to violently repress popular protests. The question is no longer "when” but "how" Iran will transition from authoritarian rule. An unaddressed question that requires an exploration of the alternative models that may fill the power vacuum following the collapse of the Islamic Republic.

Iran Human Rights has invited experts and academics to start the discussion on "Iran in Transition" from their respective specialist fields. 

Read more about the aims of "Iran in Transition"

In this essay, Michael Karlberg explores "the Future of Governance in Iran: Beyond Western Liberal Democracy." You can watch Michael presenting his paper at the end of the essay at the "Iran in Transition" online conference held on 31 January-1 February 2022.

Michael Karlberg is a professor of Communication Studies at Western Washington University. His interdisciplinary scholarship examines prevailing conceptions of human nature, power, social organization, and social change – and their implications for the pursuit of peace and justice. He authored the books "Beyond the Culture of Contest" and "Constructing Social Reality: An Inquiry into the Normative Foundations of Social Change" as well as numerous articles on related themes, including the need to move beyond the limitations of prevailing Western liberal models of democracy.

Abstract: As growing numbers of Iranians aspire toward an authentically democratic system of governance, they might  do well to set their sights beyond the limitations of prevailing Western liberal models of democracy. As a modest  contribution to such efforts, this paper explores core limitations of Western liberal democracy, discusses insights that  can be gleaned from recent innovations in democracy, and encourages Iranians to embark on a process of systematic learning and capacity building by which they can construct a more mature system of democratic governance. Such a system could serve as a model from which even long-established Western liberal democracies might learn in the coming century.

Keywords: Iran, Governance, Democracy, Liberalism, Competition, Nonpartisan, Alternative

After the outpouring of discontent in 2009, it became clear that growing numbers of Iranians long  for a transition to democracy – especially young people. They aspire to elect those who govern them  through transparent, fair, and inclusive processes. They aspire toward reasonable freedoms of  conscience, belief, speech, and association. They aspire to be heard by a government that  thoughtfully considers the diverse experiences, views, and concerns within the population and takes  these into account in its decisions. They aspire toward the rule of law and due process before the  law, based on a constitution that recognizes the rights of all Iranians. These hallmarks of democracy  are legitimate aspirations of all peoples. Wherever they have been authentically established, they  represent remarkable historical advances over the autocratic forms of government that have  preceded them. Wherever they have been authentically established, they have widened the circle of  those who can contribute to the advancement of a nation and the prosperity of its peoples.

At the same time, all those who care about the future of Iran would do well to reflect on the  conditions under which democracies can flourish and on what can be learned, in this regard, from  other experiences with democracy. Beyond merely emulating long-established models of democracy – many of which are plagued with dysfunction and abuse, unable to manage the affairs of state in a  just and responsible manner – Iran should seek to advance the practice of democracy. In this regard,  the people of Iran would do well to set their sights beyond the corrupting and increasingly dysfunctional contests for power that characterize many Western liberal democracies today.

Beyond Western Liberalism 

Western liberal models of democracy are frequently presented as the only rational alternatives to  political violence or tyranny. The problems inherent in these models are thus widely accepted as  necessary evils. Of course, variations on the Western liberal theme are often explored at the level of  campaign financing, electoral procedures, and so forth. But the core assumption that democratic  governance requires a contest of power is rarely questioned. Rather, competitive democracy is widely implicitly assumed to represent ‘the end of history’ when it comes to political innovation.[i] These  triumphalist notions presume that deeper processes of democratic innovation have largely come to  end. According to this view, the political experiments that characterized so much of human history  have largely played themselves out and variations on the theme of Western liberal democracy have  emerged as the most just and sustainable models of political organization. 

Yet Western liberal models have proven patently incapable of addressing the increasingly complex  domestic and international problems now facing humanity. Thus, it would be more plausible to say  that the history of humankind as a community of inextricably interdependent nations, inhabiting a common homeland, grappling with shared existential crises and threats, is just beginning. Under  these conditions, brought on by our reproductive and technological success as a species, nations  have barely begun to experiment with just and sustainable models of political organization.

As we turn our attention toward the future of Iran, we would do well to expand our social imaginary  beyond Western liberal contests of power. Of course, Western liberal systems represent significant  historical accomplishments. They were reasonable adaptations to the social and ecological  conditions prevailing at the time of their emergence – at least when viewed from the standpoint of  those whose interests they best served. But these systems were also complicit in many of the greatest  abuses and horrors of the modern era, from indigenous genocides and racialized slavery to two  World Wars and the holocaust. Moreover, the emergence of the prevailing model of competitive  democracy predates the invention of electricity, the internal combustion engine, air travel, broadcast  media, computers, the internet, social media, weapons of mass destruction, instruments of mass  manipulation, appetites of mass consumption, global capitalism, global pandemics, and global  warming. Democratic systems of governance have not kept pace and today they are woefully  anachronistic and maladaptive. 

Fortunately, processes of social innovation have not come to an end. One of the most compelling  proofs of this is a process that, remarkably, had its origins in Iran – and constitutes one of Iran’s  singularly important contemporary contributions to human knowledge about governance. This  process is the experiment in governance that has been systematically advancing for over a century  through the work of the worldwide Bahá’í community, which had its inception in Iran. Though the  evolving Bahá’í system of governance is currently banned in Iran, and some of its elected leaders  were executed by the regime even before it was banned, all those who are interested in the future of  Iran and its transition to democracy would do well to glean relevant insights from this remarkable  social experiment. However, before examining some of these insights, it will help to consider, in  greater depth, why Iran would do well to set its sights beyond familiar models of Western liberal  democracy.

The Limits of Competitive Democracy 

Western liberal democracy, at its core, is based on the premise that democratic governance requires  individuals and groups to compete for political power. The most recognizable form this takes is the  party system. Concerned observers of party systems have long been noting the problem of gridlock, the breakdown in civility, the rise of mean-spiritedness, the spread of corruption and influence  peddling, the disregard for truth, and the rise of political extremism. What few recognize, however,  is that these developments are not the corruption of competitive democracy. They are its  culmination. These developments are the sour fruit inherent in the seeds of competitive democracy.

These seeds, to be more precise, are the assumptions about human nature and social order that  underlie political competition. The first assumption is that human nature is essentially selfish and  competitive. The second is that different groups of people will naturally develop divergent interests  that will invariably conflict. The third is that, given a selfish human nature and the problem of  conflicting interests, the fairest and most efficient way to govern a society is to harness these  dynamics through processes of interest-group competition.

Based on these assumptions, competitive democracies set up checks and balances to limit the  excessive accumulation of power in the hands of any given interest group. They also try to cultivate  minimal codes of civility intended to restrain the basest expressions of political competition. But all  such measures tend to be undermined by the structural incentives of the system itself. To grasp  these incentives, consider the market metaphor that is often invoked to understand political  competition. Democracy is conceived as a political marketplace within which political entrepreneurs  and their corporate parties try to advance their interests through open competition. The invisible  hand of the political market allegedly works to direct this competition toward the maximum public  benefit. Within this model, parties incorporate around aggregated sets of interests in order to pool  the political capital of distinct interest groups. Contests then determine leadership and control within  and among parties as politicians and parties organize to fight and win elections.[ii] This logic ensures  that winning elections and extending political careers trumps all other values.

Once leadership is determined through electoral contests, decision making is structured in a parallel  manner, as a competitive debate. In theory, debate functions as an open marketplace of ideas in  which the best ideas prevail – again through the operation of a hypothetical invisible hand. In  practice, political competition transforms debate into a struggle over political capital. Debate thus  becomes an extension of the electoral process itself, providing a stage for ‘permanent campaigns,’ or  never-ending contests over political capital, in anticipation of the next round of elections.[iii]Furthermore, much political decision making occurs outside of formal public debates. Moreover, public debates often serve as little more than a veneer on complex behind-the-scenes processes of  political bargaining, negotiation, and influence peddling – all characterized by similarly competitive dynamics.[iv]

The most obvious problem with such models is their vulnerability to the corrupting influence of  money – as virtually everyone recognizes. This is because political competition is expensive.  Successful campaigns are waged by those who have the financial support, both direct and indirect, of affluent market actors. This problem is widely recognized, and it largely explains the cynicism and  apathy reflected in low voter turnout in many countries. The underlying cause of this problem, however, is seldom examined and even more rarely addressed. We hear occasional calls for campaign finance reform and similar regulatory measures. Yet the root of the problem is organizing  governance as a contest for power. From the moment we structure elections as contests, which  require money to win, we invert the proper relationship between government and the market. Rather  than our market existing within the envelope of responsible government regulation, governments  are captured by powerful market actors and forces. 

As long as governance is organized in this manner, the inverted relationship between governments  and markets cannot be fully corrected. Any scheme to tweak the rules here and there will merely  cause money to flow through new paths. This is what occurs, for instance, with attempts to reform  campaign financing. New forms of contribution merely eclipse the old. Even if campaign financing could be eliminated altogether, money will merely flow through other points of political influence  such as broadcast media and social media, which have already become instruments for shaping  public opinion formation, electoral outcomes, and other political processes. In a competitive  political system, money will always flow to the most effective points of political influence just as  water always flows to the point of lowest elevation. We can alter the path of that flow, but we  cannot stop it. 

This problem is a primary cause of the growing disparities of wealth and poverty we are witnessing  throughout much of the Western world. The few exceptions to this are countries with ethnically  homogenous and relatively affluent populations willing to spend on social benefits for people they  perceive as similar. Such countries have only recently encountered the challenge of sustaining  investments in universal social benefits as their populations diversify and as global economic  advantages shift. It is not at all clear if the most egalitarian partisan democracies can sustain  investments in universal social benefits under such pressures. 

Beyond the corrupting influence of money, political competition fails to provide an effective way to  understand and solve complex problems because it reduces the diversity of perspectives and voices  in decision making processes. Competitive debates are premised on the view that if one perspective is right then a different perspective must be wrong. However, an adequate grasp of most complex  issues requires consideration of multiple, often complementary, perspectives. This is because  complex issues tend to be multifaceted – like many-sided objects that must be viewed from different  angles to be adequately seen and understood. Different perspectives reveal different facets of  complex issues. Maximum understanding emerges through the careful consideration of as many  facets as possible. This does not assume that every view is valid. Rather, it presumes that diverse  views can be complementary, and deliberative processes are needed to sift diverse, valid,  complementary views from erroneous or fabricated views, while integrating the former into a more  comprehensive understanding. Yet political competition militates against these processes because  debates assume the oppositionality, rather than the complementarity, of diverse views. Even when  participants do not believe this on an epistemological level, they tend to accept it on a pragmatic  level because they cannot gain partisan advantage at the expense of their opponent unless they win  and their opponent loses in the court of public opinion. As a result, political competition encourages  people to frame complex issues in unnecessarily simplistic, conflictual, and irreconcilable terms.

Partisan politics is also inherently incapable of addressing problems across expanses of time and  space. Consider first the problem of time. Complex social and environmental issues generally require  long-term planning and commitment, as well as ongoing modes of learning, adjusting, and adapting  as insight is gained and conditions change. Competitive political systems, however, are inherently  constrained by short-term planning horizons and efforts to impose one-time solutions. This is  because to gain and maintain power, political entrepreneurs must cater to the immediate perceived  interests of their constituents so that results can be realized within frequent election cycles. Even  when long-term political commitments are adopted out of principle, by one candidate or party,  continuity tends to be compromised by succeeding candidates or parties who dismantle or fail to  enforce the programs of their predecessors in order to distance themselves from policies they were  previously compelled to oppose on the campaign trail or as the voice of opposition. 

The focus of campaigns and political parties on constituencies-in-the-present therefore undermines  commitment to the interests of future generations. Prominent among the interests of future  generations is environmental sustainability. Many social problems also require long-term strategies and commitments. Sustained investments in education, the strengthening of families and  communities, the creation of economic opportunities, the cultivation of ethical codes and moral  values, and other approaches that yield results across generations are required. Yet the competitive  pressure to demonstrate visible actions within frequent election cycles tends to lead instead toward  investments in things that distract citizens with short-term material enticements or, even worse, a  fleeting sense of self-esteem derived from tribalistic self-aggrandizement.

Just as competitive political systems are primarily responsive to constituents-in-the-present at the  exclusion of future generations, they are also primarily responsive to the interests of constituents within-electoral-boundaries at the exclusion of distant others. This is especially the case at the level  of the nation state due to the absence of effective mechanisms of global governance and  coordination. Again, this has significant social and ecological implications. The transboundary nature  of many modern environmental issues – such as global warming, the spread of pollution, and the  mass extinction of species we are currently witnessing – signals the need for unprecedented levels of  global cooperation and coordination. Competitive notions of national sovereignty, however, which  are extensions of competitive domestic politics, render the existing international (dis)order incapable  of responding to these ecological imperatives. Within the existing international system, cross-border  coordination is sacrificed to the pursuit of perceived national self-interests because political  entrepreneurs have no choice but to cater to the perceived interests of their own voting citizens. The  consequence is an anarchic system of nation states vying with one another in their rush to convert  long-term ecological capital into short-term political capital.

The problem of territoriality is equally significant when it comes to social issues. Problems such as  poverty, crime, the exploitation of women and children, human trafficking, terrorism, ethnic  conflict, illegal immigration, refugee flows, and so forth, do not respect national boundaries any  more than most ecological problems do. Neither do global health pandemics – as the current Covid  pandemic amply demonstrates. Such problems cannot be solved by national governments alone. Yet  political competition within nation states undermines effective commitment and coordination  among the global community of nation states for the same reasons cited above. 

Other problems associated with competitive politics are less tangible, but no less important. These  are the moral or spiritual costs of partisanship and political competition. Again, these problems stem  directly from the assumptions that underlie the model: that human nature is essentially selfish and  competitive; that different people tend to develop conflicting interests; and that the best way to  organize democratic governance is therefore through a process of interest-group competition. When  we organize human affairs according to these assumptions, we cultivate our basest instincts. In the  process, we become what we assume of ourselves. However, these assumptions have no solid basis  in the social and behavioral sciences. In these fields, the emerging consensus is that human beings  have the developmental potential for both egoism and altruism, competition and cooperation.[v] Which of these potentials is more fully realized is a function, in part, of how our behaviors are  incentivized by social institutions and fostered through social norms – including the incentives and norms of political competition.

Toward Democratic Alternatives to Political Competition 

Moving beyond Western liberal models of competitive democracy will require sustained  commitments to learning and capacity building. No single alternative that can be identified today offers all the answers. But underlying principles can be gleaned from a range of social innovations that point beyond the prevailing culture of contest. If such principles are applied in purposeful and systematic processes of collective learning and capacity building, they will enable Iran to develop more mature approaches to democratic governance. 

For instance, in the past few decades, a number of innovative experiments with deliberative  democracy – known as deliberative opinion polls – have been run in the United States, China, Brazil,  Britain, Denmark, Australia, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Northern Ireland, and across the entire  European Union.6[vi] These projects have generated rich insights regarding how to engage diverse  publics in thoughtful processes of consultation, on complex issues, in ways that foster mature views  that can directly inform governmental decision making. Among the insights these projects have  yielded are how to include participants that constitute a representative cross section of the wider  population; how to foster conditions that encourage the impartial consideration of a range of values  and interests, alongside a range of relevant empirical data and varying interpretations of such data;  how to ensure freedom of expression within a framework of mutual respect; how to foster  deliberative processes focused on the wider public good rather than initial personal preferences or  the desires of narrow interest groups; how to shield such processes from the distorting influences of  money or sensationalized media coverage; how to encourage processes of genuine learning among  the participants, through which initial opinions frequently evolve based on consideration of other  views and new information. Moreover, participation in these processes frequently has the effect of  increasing a citizen’s sense of political efficacy and engagement. Clearly, much can be learned from  these innovative projects, along with parallel innovations such as citizens’ assemblies – another model  that engages cross sections of the public in meaningful deliberative processes that inform processes  of legislation and policy formulation.[vii] Such assemblies have been held in Canada, the Netherlands,  Denmark, Poland, Belgium, the US, France, the UK, and other countries. 

Other insights can be gleaned from existing examples of nonpartisan democracy which, though still  characterized by electoral competition among individual candidates, demonstrate how the divisive  impacts of political factionalization can be reduced in democratic systems. Nonpartisan democracies,  it should also be noted, are distinct from one-party systems in which a single ideologically defined  party constitutes the permanent state-sanctioned ruling party, which controls who can stand for  office. Truly nonpartisan democracies, in contrast, are open to candidates that reflect the full range  of views present in a population – provided, of course, they have the means to mount an effective  campaign. Nauru, Tuvalu, Palau, the Pitcairn Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and some  other Pacific nations have nonpartisan democracies. Likewise, some states and territories within  democratic nations, such as the Northwest Territories and Nunavut in Canada, the Nebraskan  legislature in the US, and other examples in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, have no parties.  From 1986 to 2005, Uganda also had a system of nonpartisan democracy. Some other countries have partial nonpartisan systems, such as Indonesia, where the upper house of the bicameral legislature is nonpartisan by design. And some of the most prominent founders of the United States argued against the formation of political parties but, in the absence of legal restrictions on party formation, parties quickly emerged – which constitutes another important insight. Remarkably, nonpartisan systems have received virtually no serious, sustained, fair-minded attention from modern political scientists, due to the prevailing Western liberal consensus that political parties are either desirable or inevitable features of democracy. Iranians would do well to examine the experience of nonpartisan systems if they hope to restrain the divisive and corrupting influences of partisanship.

Finally, as alluded to earlier in this paper, the worldwide Bahá’í community has developed a unique  system of governance, characterized by electoral processes that are entirely free of competition,  from which many insights can be gleaned. With a current membership of over eight million people,  drawn from over 2000 ethnic backgrounds and residing in every nation on the planet, the  community is a microcosm of the entire human race. This diverse community has constructed a  system of democratically elected assemblies that govern Bahá’í affairs in over 6000 localities and  over 190 nations throughout the planet.[viii] Significantly, in many parts of the world, the first exercises in democratic activity have occurred within Bahá’í communities.

The Bahá’í electoral system is entirely non-partisan and non-competitive. In brief, at this stage in the  evolution of this system, all community members 18 years old and older are eligible to vote in annual  local elections, and every adult member 21 years or older has the duty to serve if elected. At the  national level, elections occur annually through a two-stage delegate system in which locally elected  delegates elect members of their respective national assembly from among the entire adult Bahá’í  population in the country. Those elected to serve on national assemblies also serve as delegates,  every five years, to elect the Universal House of Justice, which is the Bahá’í community’s global  governing body. 

At every one of these levels, there is an unambiguous prohibition against all forms of nomination,  campaigning, partisanship, and competition. Voters are guided only by their own consciences as they  exercise true freedom of choice in voting for those individuals that they believe best embody the  qualities of recognized ability, mature experience, and selfless service to others. Voters are also  encouraged to maximize the diversity of those they are electing. And voters do not discuss among  themselves who they will vote for. Through a plurality count, the nine individuals that receive the  most votes are called to serve as members of the governing body – even though none of them  sought such service.

Because no one seeks election, and because governing decisions are made by elected bodies as a  whole rather than by individuals, elections are not pathways to personal power and privilege. On the  contrary, elections are calls to service and self-sacrifice. The elected sacrifice their time and energy,  and often their career aspirations, at the bidding of the community. No one calls attention to  themselves or solicits votes in any way. On the contrary, a culture has developed in which Bahá’ís  interpret any solicitation of votes as an indicator of egoism and a lack of fitness to serve. 

All decision making within these governing bodies is, in turn, guided by consultative principles that  enable decision making to be a collaborative and unifying process rather than a competitive and  divisive one. These principles include striving to enter the process in a spirit of detachment from  preconceived views; regarding diversity as an asset and soliciting the perspectives, concerns, and  expertise of others; striving to transcend the limitations of one’s own ego and perspective; striving to  express oneself with care and moderation; striving to raise the context of decision making to the  level of principle; striving for consensus but settling for a majority when necessary; and supporting  the majority decision even when one did not hold it, so that unified implementation will reveal any  shortcomings in the decision and adjustments can then be made based on the experience generated.

Unlike competitive systems in which decision makers must continually negotiate the demands of  constituents, campaign contributors, lobbyists, and activists, the Bahá’í system is shielded from  external lobbying and other pressures to influence decisions. This is accomplished in at least two  ways. First, as discussed above, those who are elected did not seek election and they have no interest in re-election. In this regard, elected members are not political entrepreneurs seeking to build or  retain political capital and political careers. Thus, campaign financing opportunities do not exist  because there are no campaigns. Second, elected members decide matters collectively through the  application of principle, according to the promptings of their own consciences (one of the primary  qualities for which they were elected) and not according to the dictates or pressures of competing  interest groups. In this regard, elected members are expected to weigh all of their decisions in a  principled manner, even if this means forgoing immediate local or short-term benefits out of  consideration for the welfare of distant peoples or future generations. 

As the Bahá’í community has grown in experience, capacity, and prominence, its electoral model has  attracted the attention of outside observers such as the United Nations, which has recognized its  potential as a system from which emerging democracies might draw significant lessons.[ix] As another contemporary observer wrote about the Bahá’í model, “Humans can be nudged to demonize – or to  cooperate… In this way, Bahá’í elections are to politics what mediation is to the legal system: a  different game altogether. One designed to exploit the human capacity for cooperation, rather than  competition.”[x]

It is also important to note that the Bahá’í system, by design, cannot be imposed on a population. It  only functions when participants enter, in a supremely voluntary manner, into a covenantal  relationship and the mutual obligations it entails. Furthermore, the structural dimensions of this  model have been evolving for over a century within the Bahá’í community in tandem with a  corresponding culture that enables and supports it. Such a culture cannot be created overnight. It  has to develop organically through a systematic process of education and training, learning and  capacity building, pursued over generations. Nonetheless, any nation that aspires toward meaningful  democracy must take seriously these kinds of considerations. Structural change and cultural change  must go hand in hand to sustain each other. And a just political constitution can be sustained only  on the basis of an underlying moral covenant. 

The Path Ahead 

The preceding discussion does not constitute a specific prescription for Iran. Its purpose has been  to suggest some underlying principles that might inform processes of learning and capacity building  in a transition to a more democratic Iran. For instance, the Bahá’í model is not a complete system of  governance for society – nor do Bahá’ís make such a claim. Rather, the model was examined as one  of many that might offer fresh insights and organizing principles. In this regard, in their system of  governance, Bahá’ís are learning how to give expression to principles such as the oneness of  humanity, unity in diversity, truth and justice, the equality of women and men, cooperation and  mutuality, and the harmony of science and religion in ways that may contain lessons worth reflecting  on. At a minimum, the Bahá’í experience suggests that Western liberal models of democracy do not  represent the endpoint of democratic innovation, nor the outer limits of what humans are  collectively capable of. In this regard, Iran would do well to look beyond Western liberal models and  develop a more coherent normative framework to guide its transition to democracy. 

Any transition to democracy in Iran will also need to take account of the nation’s distinguished  history, culture, and strengths – to build on those. For instance, the Zoroastrian teachings on good  and evil, on the eternal life of the soul, and on the refinement of human thought, speech, and  behavior exerted a civilizing influence across the entire region – even influencing classical Greek philosophy. By the 6th century B.C., the Achaemenid Persian Empire, which extended across forty  percent of the global human population at its height, had established an unprecedented code of  human rights under the founding leadership of Cyrus the Great. Likewise, the great Persian poets – Rumi, Saadi, Hafez, and others – responding in part to the ennobling influence of Islam while  building on their unique cultural heritage, contributed to a literary tradition that has few parallels in  the world. And today, the Bahá’í Faith can be understood as a singularly significant contribution to modernity. 

Recognizing such distinctions and accomplishments will help Iranians construct a just, enlightened,  and culturally unique system of governance that could serve as a model from which even long established Western liberal democracies might learn in the coming century. Thus, far from  constituting an indictment of democracy, this paper constitutes an appeal to expand the horizon of  democracy. At the outset of a transition to democracy, this entails taking stock of relevant insights and lessons, wherever they can be gleaned. It will then entail efforts to foster democratic capacities – on structural and cultural levels – for ongoing learning and refinement based on accumulating  experience. Were Iran to embark on such a path, it would find itself a leader among nations in its  contributions to the advancement of human civilization.

Endnotes 

[i] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[ii] David Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996) p. 170.

[iii] Sydney Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign (Boston: Beacon, 1980).

[iv] Refer, for example, to Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis, War without Bloodshed: The Art of Politics (New York: Touchstone, 1997).

[v] Refer, for instance, to the ‘Statement on Violence, Seville, May 16, 1986,’ Medicine and War 3 (1987); Robert  Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books: A Subsidiary of Perseus Books, L.L.C., 1984); John  Casti, ‘Cooperation: The Ghost in the Machinery of Evolution,’ in Cooperation and Conflict in General  Evolutionary Processes, eds. John Casti and Anders Karlqvist (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994); Teresa  Lunati, ‘On Altruism and Cooperation,’ Methodus 4, no. December (1992); Steven Rose, R. C. Lewontin,  and Leon Kamin, Not In Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 1987); Martin  Nowak and Roger Highfield, Super Cooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed (New York: Free Press, 2012); Michael Tomasello, Why We Cooperate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009);  Nicholas Chistakis, Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society (Boston: Little, Brown Spark, 2019).

[vi] Refer, for instance, to James Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); James Fishkin and Cynthia Farra, ‘Deliberative Polling: From  Experiment to Community Resource,’ in The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic  Engagement in the 21st Century, eds. John Gatsil and Peter Levine (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005).

[vii] Refer, for instance, to Larry Patriquin, Permanent Citizens’ Assemblies: A New Model for Public Deliberation (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019); Mark Warren and Hilary Pearse, Designing Deliberative Democracy: The  British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[viii] Department of Statistics, Bahá'í World Centre, 2021.

[ix] United Nations Institute for Namibia, Comparative Electoral Systems & Political Consequences: Options for  Namibia, Namibia Studies Series No 14, ed. N. K. Duggal (Lusaka, Zambia: United Nations, 1989) p. 6-7.

[x] Amanda Ripley, High Conflict: Why We Get Trapped and How We Get Out (New York: Simon & Schuster,  2021) p. 95.